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Abstract
Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms 
of proximate psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the 
psychologically most informed accounts and offer a critical discussion of 
their hypotheses for the proximate psychological explanations. Based on 
convergent evidence from several fields of research, we argue that there 
nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: 
the social motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more 
basic explanation of the appeal of prosocial behavior, which is in terms 
of anticipated social rewards. We also argue in favor of our own social 
motivation hypothesis over Robert Sugden’s fellow-feeling account (due 
originally to Adam Smith). We suggest that social motivation not only 
stands as a proximate account in its own right but also provides a plausible 
scaffold for other more sophisticated motivations (e.g., fellow-feelings). We 
conclude by discussing some possible implications of the social motivation 
hypothesis on existing modeling practice.
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1. Introduction
It is widely accepted that a distinctive aspect of human sociality is the perva-
sive engagement in “prosocial behavior,” which can be roughly characterized 
here as an individual’s choice to forgo her immediate material interests to 
benefit other(s) or a group to which she belongs. Many behavioral economic 
models hypothesize some proximate motivations in addition to purely mate-
rial self-interest to explain such prosocial behavior. However, the proposed 
psychological mechanisms are often rather casually proposed to accommo-
date behavioral data in stock experimental games and are often poorly 
informed by psychological research. Moreover, contrary to the stated ambi-
tions, this strategy so far remains unsuccessful in delivering a unified picture 
of what motivates prosocial behavior (Clavien and Klein 2010).
This article was triggered by the following observation: perhaps there are 
too many models and not enough attention to the empirical work in various 
areas of psychology. It seems as though we should try to get the psychologi-
cal (proximate) mechanisms right before modeling a particular motivation as 
an augment of an individual utility function, or presuming that such modeling 
strategy is indeed the best way to proceed. We support this move while 
acknowledging that like any empirical hypothesis, psychological ones are 
fallible and in principle open to revision. Still, we hope that this article will 
not only provide the reader with a psychologically realistic and plausible 
proximate account of prosocial behavior but also prompt some general meth-
odological reflections on how psychological research bears on existing mod-
eling practice.
We proceed as follows. In section 2, we consider the two psychologically 
most informed economic modeling strategies for explaining prosociality and 
argue that they are, at least as it stands, unsatisfactory with respect to provid-
ing proximate accounts of prosocial behavior. In section 3, we consider Adam 
Smith’s fellow-feeling hypothesis revived by Robert Sugden (2002), as a 
more promising alternative for the motivations for norm-following/team-
reasoning. In section 4, we present a different social motivation hypothesis as 
well as some convergent evidence for it, and in section 5, we argue that social 
motivations might be understood as a scaffold for the more specific rewards 
involved in fellow-feelings and, analogously, as a general scaffolder for other 
candidate proximate accounts of prosocial behavior. Section 6 concludes 
with some methodological reflections.
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2. Economic Models of Prosocial Behavior
Prosocial behavior, such as cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and 
public goods games (PG), fair offers in ultimatum bargaining games (UG), 
and trusting and sharing in trust games, is a fairly robust experimental phe-
nomenon—even in those experiments where one is careful to ensure that the 
subjects believe that interactions are anonymous and that there is no future 
interaction with other subjects (see, for example, Camerer 2003, chapter 2 for 
a review).
We can identify at least four approaches within the rational choice tradi-
tion that purport to explain such experimental results as well as our prosocial 
behavior in analogous real-life situations. The first two are (i) the rational 
cooperation in repeated games approach, according to which people mistak-
enly behave prosocially in one-shot games because humans have evolved in 
repeated interactions where cooperation is rational (e.g., Binmore 2006); and 
(ii) the social preference approach, which models people’s motivations as 
stable “social preferences” for equity, fairness, and so on that are defined in 
terms of the material payoffs of games (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999). 
Although popular among behavioral economists, there is convincing empiri-
cal evidence against these hypotheses (see, for example, Gächter and Thöni 
2007 for a review). Moreover, these accounts do not explicitly address moti-
vations of prosocial behavior: the first (i) simply assumes such motivations to 
be explanatorily irrelevant and the second (ii) crudely equates prosocial moti-
vations with preferences for different distribution of players’ material payoffs 
in games. We, therefore, focus on the two other approaches in this paper: (1) 
social norms and (2) team-reasoning.
Both (1) social norms and (2) team-reasoning seem to hold the most prom-
ise for explaining a range of experimental results (see Tan and Zizzo 2008; 
Guala, Mittone, and Ploner 2013, for empirical evaluations). The approaches 
are also (though not always) accompanied by explicit discussions of what 
motivates norm adherence and team-reasoning, respectively. However, after 
a discussion of each approach, we will briefly argue that these proximate 
accounts are ultimately unsatisfactory.
2.1. Social Norms Approach
The social norms approach has been gaining popularity due to the growing 
evidence that specific expectations (beliefs) as well as preferences influence 
prosocial behavior in economic games. Unlike the social preferences 
approach, which assumes some stable other-regarding preferences at work in 
all contexts, the social norm approach adopts the idea of conditional 
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preference. One of the main proponents of the approach, Christina 
Bicchieri thus argues that the preference to follow a norm or behavioral 
rule is activated only if the individual believes (a) that enough others will 
follow the rule (“empirical expectation”) and (b) that enough others will 
expect her to follow (“normative expectation”) (Bicchieri 2006). Due to 
this conditionalization of preferences as relative to certain expectations 
and perhaps also what norms are identified, the social norms have a posi-
tive explanation for why we should expect (some) prosocial behavior to 
occur in some contexts (e.g., ultimatum games with humans) and not in 
others (e.g., ultimatum games with computers) (see Bicchieri 2006, 125, 
also 168-170). Once these epistemic conditions of norm identification are 
met, Bicchieri’s model predicts that players’ payoffs in a game are trans-
formed. That is, players’ payoffs for different outcomes of the game are 
subjectively modified to take into account players’ taste for certain social 
norms (of fairness, cooperation, etc.). This changes the payoff structure of 
the PD and other economic games by, for example, rendering defection or 
“unfair” behavior less attractive, which in turn makes their overall self-
interest aligned with prosocial norms. Social norms “tug at our utility” of 
what is economically rational (Paternotte and Grose 2012). The approach 
thus models individual utilities such that they involve preferences for 
norm conformity.
But what precisely motivates people to follow social norms, once the epis-
temic conditions of norm identification are met? Insofar as the social norm 
approach can go beyond just describing the behavior itself in terms of condi-
tional preferences or stipulate that the mere identification of the norm itself 
automatically triggers norm-following, the model owes us a proximate expla-
nation for why agents are motivated to follow the norm and adhere to others’ 
expectations.1 In other words, the mere activation of a social norm (or an 
expectation that there is such a norm at work) is not sufficient since there 
must be something that explains why empirical and normative expectations 
matter to individuals.
The same question is provoked by Herbert Gintis’s (2010) model of social 
norms, which, just like Bicchieri’s, presupposes that people have preferences 
1 Although Bicchieri (2006, 3) explicitly states that her belief-desire model of choice 
is compatible with the possibility that our norm-following behavior occurs subcon-
sciously without deliberate decision, she does not understand this folk psychological 
model as an “as if” model.
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to follow social norms.2 Gintis (2011), however, stresses that certain moral 
values and character virtues lead individuals to voluntarily conform to 
norms. These values and virtues include promise-keeping, fairness, and hon-
esty, and they manifest as behavioral regularities that facilitate cooperation 
and enhance social efficiency (Gintis 2011, 884). According to Gintis, indi-
viduals internalize these behavioral regularities through processes of social-
ization where the moral values and character are instilled by the interplay of 
affect and authority and induce us to comply and conform to the specified 
norms that promote prosocial behavior. This internalization means agents 
behave prosocially even if there is no possibility of being penalized for self-
ish behavior and being rewarded for prosocial behavior. “Morality, in this 
way, is doing the right thing even if no one is looking” (Gintis 2010, 252).
Now, Gintis admits that moral character and virtues do not always guaran-
tee norm abidance as other conflicting interests are also present. Yet insofar 
as we act prosocially, Gintis believes that the central motivation for such 
behavior is normative or moral: doing the right thing in the situation. Still, it 
seems that Gintis might be too optimistic in thinking that moral and character 
virtues alone are responsible for inducing norm abidance. Recent empirical 
work in moral psychology shows that those moral principles and character, 
including virtues, which are used to justify actions, do not appear to have any 
“formative” role in our decision-making (for a review, see Merritt, Doris, and 
Harman 2010). Some even suggest that moral reasoning is a result of con-
fabulation (Schnall, Benton, and Harvey 2008; Wheatley and Haidt 2005). 
Either way, the role of moral traits and virtues as proximate explanations has 
not been confirmed to the extent assumed by Gintis.3
Bicchieri (2006, 13-25) provides a more nuanced and extended proximate 
account. She suggests three types of motivations for norm adherence: (i) fear 
of resentment (and of more consequential punishment), (ii) desire to please 
others’ expectations and preferences, and (iii) belief that others’ normative 
expectation is legitimate. Bicchieri places most credence in (iii) and argues 
that acceptance of certain norms (e.g., cooperation in PG or fair offer in UG) 
as reasonable or legitimate is the more important proximate explanation. In 
interactions with family and friends, a generic desire to meet others’ 
2 Gintis (2010) models social norms as a coordination device (the “choreographer”) 
that enables players to choose one from multiple Nash equilibria, using the concept of 
correlated equilibrium. See for further comparisons of Biccheri’s and Gintis’s models.
3 In addition, Gintis does not specify the epistemic conditions under which once-inter-
nalized norms are triggered (see Paternotte and Grose 2012).
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expectations will suffice, but in most other interactions with socially distant 
others, she contends that generic desires (i) and (ii) have little motivating 
power, and so the beliefs about social norms being legitimate are required.
It is undeniable that people are sometimes motivated to meet others’ 
expectations because they find those expectations reasonable or legitimate. 
But it seems that norm conformity is not always associated with the percep-
tion of reasonableness. For example, Solomon Asch’s (1955) classic experi-
ments show that an individual’s easy judgment about the length of a line was 
significantly influenced by the answer given by other members of a group 
when the answer was obviously wrong but unanimous. In such cases, confor-
mity alone seems to motivate even if the expectations of others are unreason-
able. Thus, conformity seems to be de-coupled from the perceived 
reasonableness of the norms (see Lisciandra, Postma-Nilsenová, and 
Colombo 2013 for a similar conformity effect on normative judgments). In 
other words, people seem to behave as if they just want to conform to the 
majority’s opinions and preferences, regardless of whether it is reasonable to 
do so or not.
In fact, once we turn to Bicchieri’s own model, motivations of types (i) 
and (ii) seem required to derive (iii). In her account of conditional prefer-
ences, Bicchieri (2006, 15) distinguishes two types of “normative expecta-
tion,” that is, one’s belief that a sufficiently large subset of population expects 
one to conform to a behavioral regularity in a type of situation. The first type 
is an empirical expectation (i.e., belief that others think one will conform), 
and the second, normative (i.e., belief that others think one ought to con-
form).4 What motivates us to act according to such expectations? It seems 
that viewing such expectations as legitimate or reasonable is not going to do 
the work in either case: the expectation that others think one will conform 
does not in and of itself make the expectation legitimate—it is just a majority 
opinion about what will likely be the case. Similarly, a normative belief (that 
others think one ought to conform) will not be viewed as reasonable unless 
one thinks that the majority opinion itself is a source of legitimacy. In both 
cases, legitimacy or reasonableness in Bicchieri’s sense seems to be ulti-
mately grounded in the majority opinion and the majority opinion alone can 
motivate only if one already has a conformist preference of types (i) and (ii). 
4 So Bicchieri’s terminology is slightly unfortunate. When she calls two epistemic 
conditions “empirical” and “normative” expectations, she only means that the former 
is a belief about others’ behavior, while the latter is a belief about others’ beliefs about 
one’s behavior.
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For this reason, her distinction between (i) and (ii) as a generic conformist 
desire and (iii) as reason, as well as her emphasis on the latter, does not hold.5
In contrast to Gintis and Bicchieri, Robert Sugden (2000) models social 
norms explicitly based on the non-normative conformist desire. He intro-
duces a resentment hypothesis, according to which we are motivated to meet 
the expectations of others because we are averse to their resentment—a 
resentment that we expect will be provoked by frustrating their expectations. 
Sugden takes this to be an empirically confirmable fact about human psy-
chology; that is, people resent someone who violates their well-established 
empirical expectations, and people are averse to face such resentment them-
selves. Supposing we do find others’ expectations “legitimate,” then this will 
be explained by wanting to please them because not doing so will provoke 
their resentment. So to use Bicchieri’s distinctions, the type (iii) motivation 
(to do something legitimate) is grounded in type (ii) motivation (to please 
others’ expectations), which in turn derives from the more basic type (i) moti-
vation (to avoid others’ resentment).
We agree that the aversion toward being a target of resentment might 
motivate the conditional preferences to meet others’ expectations in 
Bicchieri’s model.6 Still, it is questionable whether aversion to of resentment 
is the type of psychological feature that can explain a wide range of prosocial 
behavior, including cooperation in one-shot PG games where one has no rea-
son to expect cooperation as a norm. Moreover, it raises the question of why 
others’ resentment should matter to us anyway—especially if they are strang-
ers. All the same, we do not wish to argue against the resentment hypothesis 
at this stage. We believe that the resentment hypothesis has a legitimate place 
as a proximate account but only once one finds an appropriate mechanism 
that explains why resentment should matter to us in the first place—a task we 
will turn to in the succeeding sections of this article. In section 3, we will see 
how Sugden himself suggests what might possibly scaffold such resentment, 
but in section 4 and onward, we will argue that the social motivation hypoth-
esis can provide a superior and more basic account of the resentment 
hypothesis.
5. In Bicchieri’s examples of social norm engineering, such as anti-littering and a 
campaign against college students’ binge drinking, people’s behavior changes not by 
changing their belief that a certain behavior is legitimate or not but by changing the 
perception of how widespread a certain behavior is. Such an intervention also presup-
poses a sort of generic preference for conformity.
6. Sugden (2000) sketches his own model of social norms, but to our knowledge, no 
one, including himself, has tested this model.
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2.2. Team-Reasoning Approach
A prominent contender of the social norm approach to explaining prosocial 
behavior is the team-reasoning approach (Bacharach 2006; Coleman, Pulford, 
and Rose 2008; Sugden 1993, 2000). Here, the prosocial behavior is modeled 
by an individual identifying herself as a member of a team, and thus playing 
her part to achieve the group’s objective. If a player identifies herself as a mem-
ber of a group consisting of all or most of the players, then it is rational action 
to cooperate or coordinate with others, since it will uniquely maximize the 
group’s collective payoff. The account then involves an agency transformation 
that is distinct from the payoff transformation of the social norm approach.7
The team-reasoning approach needs to specify the epistemic conditions 
for the presumed agency transformation—or shift from I-mode to we-mode, 
to use Tuomela’s (2007) terminology. Bacharach (2006), who offers one of 
the most systematic presentations of the team-reasoning approach to date, 
proposes the “interdependence hypothesis” that roughly states that the agency 
transformation is triggered if the agents perceive common goals that can only 
be achieved together (for conditions for agency transformation, see Bacharach 
2006, 83-85; Smerilli 2012). The epistemic conditions of the interdependence 
hypothesis are thus provided by such features representing the uncertain 
prospect of mutual benefit.
For Bacharach, the shift in framing occurs spontaneously and is not a mat-
ter of choice. Nevertheless, even supposing that conscious choice typically 
does not enter into the agency transformation, the account still seems to 
require some proximate account of the psychological features in the individ-
ual agent that are responsible for such a shift (Pacherie 2011). For unlike a 
purely perspectival shift between alternative ways of looking at a gestalt fig-
ure, the framing effect relevant for agency transformation does seem to 
require some sustained proximate account with both cognitive and motiva-
tional elements. Consider, for example, the analogous reference-dependent 
7 Often, the team-reasoning model is misunderstood as just another other-regarding 
preference model where “other” regards the group to which an individual belongs. 
An analysis of the Hi-Lo game shows this is not so. A Hi-Lo game is a two-person, 
two-by-two, normal form, symmetric pure coordination game in which one Nash 
equilibrium (Hi, Hi), say (2, 2) pareto-dominates the other (Lo, Lo), say (1, 1). The 
individuals’ payoff transformation that takes into account the group’s payoff changes 
the payoff of (Hi, Hi) as (4, 4), (Lo, Lo) as (2, 2), which leaves both as Nash equi-
libria. In contrast, the agency transformation makes (Hi, Hi) a unique equilibrium of 
the game.
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framing effect (Tversky and Kahneman 1981), which is purportedly proxi-
mally explained by loss-aversion.
While Bacharach (2006, chapter 3) suggests that group selection can 
account for why propensities to team reason have arisen under conditions 
consistent with the interdependence hypothesis, he does not give any detail as 
to what psychological propensities account for the identification of such fea-
tures. Indeed, it is not only team-reasoning accounts that are typically silent 
on what motivates the initial and continued attachment to the group. This 
problem is common with an influential philosophical theory of collective 
intentionality (Gilbert 2013), which presupposes a joint commitment of the 
members to their group’s goals but does not give an account of proximate 
motivation for such commitment (Pacherie 2011).
It is notable that the resentment hypothesis, which was intended as a com-
plement to the social norm approach, is not applicable in the case of team 
reasoning. Since a key epistemic condition spelled out in the interdependence 
hypothesis is a perception of a mutually beneficial but uncertain outcome, 
this seems to block the possibility that it is the fear of resentment that moti-
vates agent transformation (since why would such circumstances provoke 
resentment?). Moreover, presumably collective intentionality theorists would 
also hesitate to posit fear of resentment as a motivational basis of a joint com-
mitment, since that would reduce the model of collective intentionality to one 
of individual norm-following like Bicchieri’s.
2.3. Summary
In this section, we have discussed the proximate hypotheses of the most psy-
chologically informed economic approaches to prosocial behavior: the social 
norm and team-reasoning approaches. Our first result is that Bicchieri’s 
model of social norms presupposes some motivational account and that 
Sugden’s resentment hypothesis is currently the best candidate. However, we 
also suggested that the hypothesis seems to call for an explanation of why the 
resentment of others should matter to us and noted that it is illfitted to deal 
with the team-reasoning approach (which lacks any explicit proximate 
account of its own). We now move on to some general proximate accounts 
that are more promising but will have reasons to return some of the hypoth-
eses of this past section (like the resentment hypothesis) in section 5 to show 
how they can be scaffolded on more basic social motivations.
3. The “Fellow-Feeling” Hypothesis
In his 2002 article, Sugden admits that team-reasoning lacks a motivational 
dimension just like other rational choice models. His remedy draws heavily 
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on Adam Smith’s ([1759] 2002, 82) work Theory of Moral Sentiments and 
suggests that Smith’s account of fellow-feeling “may be able to fill these gaps 
by explaining the affective qualities of team thinking.” While Sugden clearly 
takes the approach as a complement to the team-reasoning account, rather 
than the social norm account, we will consider the fellow-feeling hypothesis 
as a potential psychological account of prosocial motivation in general, that 
is, for both norm-following and team-reasoning.
According to Sugden, Adam Smith suggests that simply doing things 
together with others rather than alone creates added value to activities by giv-
ing a certain satisfaction or reward. This reward is due to participants’ posi-
tive affective awareness of their corresponding sentiments. This is also the 
definition of fellow-feeling: the pleasant awareness of corresponding senti-
ments or emotions. Smith claims that this fellow-feeling is rewarding irre-
spective of the valence of original sentiments. Thus, fellow-feeling cannot be 
reduced to mere reflected emotions: “this correspondence of sentiments of 
others with our own appears to be a cause of pleasure, and want of it a cause 
of pain, which cannot be accounted for ‘by a theory of reflected feelings’” 
(Sugden 2002, 72). The agreement of feelings, be they joy or grief, is thus a 
source of reward or pleasure in its own right such that fellow-feeling “enliv-
ens joy and alleviates grief” (Smith [1759] 2002, 18).
According to Smith, our desire to experience fellow-feelings motivates us 
to align our actions and emotions with those of others. Moreover, those that 
have a history of repeated interactions will be more likely to experience such 
fellow-feelings:
On Smith’s account, it is a fact of human psychology that people who repeatedly 
interact with one another tend to develop and express common sentiments. 
Such common sentiments tend to eventually become the objects of common 
approval within the group of interacting people. Thus, the observed failure of 
any one member of a social group to uphold the attitudes of that group will 
cause pain or unease to other members (this is just the negative equivalent of 
the pleasure of mutual sympathy); and it will be disapproved of. (Sugden 2002, 
82-83)
The account can thus be seen as a proximate complement to the existing 
prosocial models since people become motivated to adjust their emotions and 
behavior to fit with the communal “norms of propriety” or else they will 
forgo opportunities for fellow-feelings. That is, the pleasure derived from 
fellow-feelings motivates individuals to uphold certain shared emotions and 
behavioral regularities that are associated with them. The pleasure associated 
with fellow-feelings also motivates individuals to identify with groups that 
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they have interacted with in the past and to uphold the communal norms of 
these groups. Alternatively, as Bicchieri would put it, fellow-feelings give 
individuals a reason to comply with empirical and normative expectations. 
While a generic desire to meet other people’s expectations cannot explain our 
context- and group-specific prosocial behavior (Bicchieri 2006, 25), the fel-
low-feeling hypothesis implies that we are only motivated by those expecta-
tions that have arisen during those previous social interactions that included 
shared sentiments. True fellow-feeling is a generic affect for both Sugden and 
Smith, but repeated interactions with fellow-feelings are needed for the 
generic emotion to reliably motivate people to follow context- and group-
specific social norms.
The affective rewards that the individuals derive from the interaction and 
the motivations that precede them are thus valuable in their own right. In 
Sugden’s (2002, 85) own words, “we directly desire to participate in society, 
and not merely the ends that it produces.” Nevertheless, the motivational power 
of the fellow-feeling proposal relies on rewards that are only attainable from 
shared emotions in social interaction and dependent on awareness of other par-
ticipants’ corresponding emotions. In the next section, we will argue that 
because of this the fellow-feeling approach is still too restrictive and that cor-
respondence or mutuality of sentiment might not be a prerequisite for all expe-
riences of intrinsic social rewards. The model we present will thus be a weaker 
and also a more basic model of social motivation. The social motivation here 
derives from social-affiliative stimuli that does not demand aligned emotions.
4. The Social Motivation Hypothesis
The pleasurable reward in the fellow-feeling account was connected to a dis-
tinctive type of social encounter. In such encounters, emotions of the partici-
pants are aligned such that all may reap enjoyment from it; but why suppose 
that it is only on these occasions that sociality is rewarding? There seems to 
be a broader array of affiliative stimuli, that is, interactions with, or observa-
tions of, other humans, which have the potential to generate intrinsically 
rewarding experiences. These occasions are often consciously recorded as 
warmth, affection, and other positive affect connected to affiliation.8 
8 In the theory of interpersonal behavior, affiliation is one of the two major indepen-
dent traits characterized by warmth, positive emotions, and agreeableness (the other 
is agency characterized by assertiveness and activity). To represent social stimuli that 
are affiliative, experiments typically use pictures of smiling babies and families (see 
Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005, 315).
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Neuroscience also suggests that the set of basic biological and psychological 
mechanisms that generate these rewards are elicited by the same modalities 
of sensory affiliative stimuli (i.e., touch), even if the social activities that 
generate the sensory stimulation are different (Crews 1998; Depue and 
Morrone-Strupinsky 2005; Mason and Mendoza 1998). Although activities 
involving shared emotional experiences certainly induce these rewards, sev-
eral other activities are also capable of this effect, for example, those that are 
more purely coordinative, explorative, and even more competitive in charac-
ter (think of how academics enjoy a verbal spar even if this activity often 
involves antagonistic emotions between the disputants).9 Sometimes the 
reward may even be elicited by something as fleeting as someone smiling at 
you.
It is commonly thought that the role of the neurobiological substrates 
underlying the affective rewards of affiliative stimuli (oxytocin, vasopressin, 
endogenous opioids) is to orient and bias attention to very basic forms of 
mammalian affiliation (parent and child) as well as forming social relation-
ships more generally (Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005; Nelson and 
Panksepp 1998). The experience of rewards attached to social interaction and 
affiliation generates social motivation circuitry that not only motivates us to 
seek the pleasure in social interactions (affective reward) but also works to 
establish and facilitate social bonds (Godman 2013). Many social bonds in 
other primates are also thought to be mediated or enhanced by rewards elic-
ited during activities such as play and grooming (Silk et al. 2009). The social 
rewards elicited by affiliative stimuli thus provide a foundation for the capac-
ity for forming social bonds crucial to human development and flourishing 
(see, for example, Baumeister and Leary 1995).
So how precisely does the experience of a reward attached to social- 
affiliative stimuli lead to a social motivation? The thriving general field of 
motivation research backs up the Humean assumption about how motivations 
typically grow out from an anticipation of a reward (Berridge 2003; Wise 
2004). In the case of social affect, the idea would be that affiliative stimuli 
9 Academics enjoy the spar and thus get reward from it, but their enjoyment is not 
shared in a robust sense (see Salmela 2012). Their emotion is shared only in a weak 
sense of being the same type (enjoyment) and having the same intentional object 
(the spar). Even if the participants enjoy the spar, their concerns are directly opposite 
within this activity: both strive to win but since spar is a zero-sum game where one 
agent’s win is another’s loss, their emotions do not correspond within the activity. 
Accordingly, no fellow-feelings emerge.
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initially become “incentively salienced” due to the biased capacity for expe-
riencing such rewards. The initial link between affiliative stimuli and social 
reward is then strengthened in terms of basic associative learning. That is, 
because rewards are typically attached to certain affiliative stimuli, they 
become increasingly associated in such a way that they yield (social) motiva-
tions in expectation of distinctively social rewards. Thus, due to the intrinsic 
rewards afforded by affiliation and sociality, we become ever more oriented 
toward the social world. But just like in the case of other rewards, sometimes, 
wanting eventually occurs without the accompanying conscious, or uncon-
scious, experience of “liking,” thereby indicating how motivations can be 
de-coupled from the associated reward (Berridge and Robinson 2003). (This 
may indeed be the case in many economic games where subjects are naturally 
conditioned to a particular social reward that is not in fact elicited).
The social motivation hypothesis then contends that there is a particular 
psychological disposition whose role is to orient us toward affiliative stimuli, 
which yields social reward (affect) and enables the formation of social bonds. 
In fact, the hypothesis is nicely captured by Coralie Chevallier and colleagues 
who defend a social motivation hypothesis in a rather different context, 
namely, in the case of autism (more on this in a moment):
Social motivation can be described as a set of psychological dispositions and 
biological mechanisms biasing the individual to preferentially orient to the 
social world (social orienting), to seek and take pleasure in social interactions 
(social reward), and to work to foster and maintain social bonds (social 
maintaining). (2012, p. 231)
It is important to emphasize that the kind of affiliative stimuli that people 
seek and find rewarding depends crucially on their past experiences and 
learned associations. Some individuals may actually become motivated to 
seek antagonistic social encounters (e.g., winning academic debates or fight-
ing with partners), perhaps because they have found other rewards in such 
activities or even because antagonism is actually a condition of affiliating 
with others. On the other hand, if one constantly meets rejection and ostra-
cism in trying to affiliate with particular others, typically one will feel bad 
and eventually give up, or try to find social rewards elsewhere. In short, 
social motivations are contingent upon their history of particular learned 
associations and although at a baseline we take some initial affiliative stimuli 
to be rewarding in their own right, we are not committed to claiming that all 
social stimuli must remain rewarding and sought for.
In recent years, there has been several studies in different domains of 
developmental psychology and psychiatry that have suggested that social 
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motivation arises early in development and is a crucial feature of human psy-
chology. Social motivations have been suggested to not only mediate and 
facilitate bonding but also to explain autism and the pervasive tendency for 
social learning (i.e., learning by copying others, rather than trial-and-error 
learning). Here, we will only mention a couple of examples of such conver-
gent evidence.
First, it is well-established that infants are born with a preferential ability 
to track and fixate stimuli that appear human-like, and evidence indicates that 
this is mediated by the neurological center for affective processing—the 
amygdala (Pierce et al. 2001; Young et al. 1995). In addition, recent research 
shows how the amygdala is involved in quickly detecting salient and diag-
nostically relevant facial features by enabling attentional orienting toward the 
visual periphery (Gamer et al. 2013). These results suggest that we are pref-
erentially oriented toward one of the most basic form of social-affiliative 
stimuli—the facial expressions of others—due to the associated affective 
reward.
Recently, social motivation has also become an important rival hypothesis 
to the standard “theory of mind deficit” approach to explaining autism 
(Chevallier et al. 2012). The model suggests that autistic subjects’ difficulties 
with social life are better accounted for by diminished social motivation 
rather than a failure of “theory of mind,” precisely because the perception of 
social-affiliative stimuli, such as facial expressions, gestures, and vocaliza-
tions, are not accompanied by any distinctive type of reward. The lack of 
social motivation, thus, impedes social development and can account for 
many of the interpersonal deficits associated with the autistic spectrum disor-
der (Chevallier et al. 2012; Maestro et al. 2002).
Finally, social motivations have been suggested to play a prominent role 
in human ontogeny in biasing social learning over individual learning. Cecilia 
Heyes (2012, 7) has, for example, suggested that what explains abundant 
human social learning strategy is social motivations and other perceptual 
biases that privilege information received via social channels over any indi-
vidual learning channels. Some evidence for this comes from work on imita-
tion where social motivations are a strong contender for explaining the 
pancultural human propensity for so-called overimitation, that is, the ten-
dency to reproduce a high-fidelity match of the model’s behavior to the extent 
that the efficiency of the task is reduced (Nielsen and Tomaselli 2010). In 
cases of overimitation, we do not reach the goal in the most effective way 
possible but try to do it in precisely the way it has been modeled to us. For 
example, children begin to overimitate at the age of two but by no means 
cease to do so when they become adults (McGuigan, Makinson, and Whiten 
2011). Social motivations provide a compelling explanation for why this is 
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so. That is, reproducing the modeled actions appears to be more important 
than merely producing the outcomes more efficiently, precisely because we 
are socially motivated to engage in the activity. (Over)imitation is not merely 
a means of learning skills or acquiring information about the world; it is also 
a means of engaging with others and attaining social rewards (Nielsen and 
Blank 2011; Uzgiris 1981). The social motivation thesis thus predicts that 
whenever the opportunity for social rewards is a particularly salient part of 
the target for learning, how the effect is produced will matter more than that 
it is produced in the most effective way possible.
Taken together this evidence from different strands of psychology also 
suggests an evolutionary argument for the emergence of social motivations. 
Most likely, social motivations originated from their role of facilitating and 
maintaining social bonds—a role that renders them not exclusively human, 
but among humans, it is likely that they are a particularly strong motivator 
(e.g., non-human animals do not tend to overimitate). Indeed, it may be part 
of the explanation for why humans are regarded as the “hyper-social spe-
cies.” Of course, many tie the trait of hyper-sociality to the emergence of 
culture, social norms, and large-scale cooperation (Boyd and Richerson 
2009), and at the very least once culture enters into the picture, it is highly 
likely that culture will co-opt some of the psychological bias for social reward 
into new roles. One such is their role in facilitating social learning and the 
fidelity of social transmission; another is further biasing individuals to proso-
cial behavior. Indeed, it is natural to suppose that social motivations are pre-
cisely the sort of psychological capacity that can be harnessed to achieve 
common, indeed, genuinely altruistic ends that involve overall material sac-
rifice for the individual, such as when social motivations help to facilitate 
cooperation and cohesion among groups.10
5. Social Motivations as Scaffolders
The social motivation hypothesis is more general than the fellow-feeling 
approach in terms of what type of stimuli yield an affective social reward. For 
affiliative stimuli to be rewarding, there is no requirement of fellow-feeling, 
or for that matter shared emotions in social activities. In this section, we will 
10 While some cooperative endeavors might only be done by groups, or are more effi-
ciently performed by groups, and so are not genuinely altruistic as they are aligned 
with self-interest; others might demand foregoing material self-interests. Researchers 
disagree on which mechanism (self-sacrificing or self-interested prosociality) has 
more explanatory relevance (see Guala 2012).
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consider the relationship between the two accounts more closely and review 
some evidence from synchrony studies that offers support to our more gen-
eral social motivation hypothesis over the fellow-feeling account. However, 
our more important aim is to argue that social motivations should be thought 
of as a scaffold for the emergence of fellow-feelings and, analogously, for 
other proximal explanations of prosocial behavior.11
Let us first review some of the evidence from the synchrony studies that 
counts in favor of the social motivation over the fellow-feeling hypothesis. 
The association between synchronized behavior, on the one hand, and affec-
tive reward, on the other, has been established in several different studies 
(e.g., Kirschner and Tomasello 2010; Reddish, Fischer, and Bulbulia 2013; 
for a review, see Knoblich, Butterfill, and Sebanz 2011). These affective 
rewards are associated with different types of synchrony, such as synchro-
nized motor representations (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004), body postures 
and gaze patterns (Shockley, Richardson, and Dale 2009), speech patterns 
(Fowler et al. 2008), facial expressions (Chartrand and Bargh 1999), or heart 
rate (Vikhoff et al. 2013) of the interactors. A prominent sociological tradi-
tion argues that synchronous activities that are ritualistic interactions, such as 
plays, games, dancing, singing, worship and ceremonies, lack any ulterior 
purpose or goal and instead have the function of producing affective rewards 
for the participants (e.g., Collins 2004; Durkheim [1912] 2001; Summers-
Effler 2007). The Smith-Sugden hypothesis posits that such rewards are pro-
duced via shared emotions and the concomitant fellow-feelings, that is, 
pleasant awareness of shared emotions. This indeed seems to be the case in 
rituals, which provide an ample basis for shared emotions that can be experi-
enced at different stages of the ritual: excitement during its performance, joy 
when it succeeds, fear when its success is threatened, disappointment at fail-
ure, anger at those disturbing the ritual or violating its rules, and so on (Helm 
2010; Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead 2005; Salmela 2012).
However, there are many other synchronous behaviors, which are not 
institutionalized as rituals but nevertheless constitute basic building blocks 
for our daily interactions with others. These tend to be reflected in experi-
ments where the resulting synchrony is accidental rather than purposefully 
achieved by the participants: individuals walk, tap fingers, rock chairs, and so 
on, either in or out of synchrony, or they rate interpersonal rapport between 
figures or sounds that are presented as in or out of synchrony (e.g., Hove and 
11 We are very grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that the concept of 
scaffolding might be used to explain their relation.
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Risen 2009; Miles, Nind, and Macrae 2009; Wiltermuth and Heath 2009). In 
these cases, there is little opportunity for feedback and little history of inter-
action or reason to suppose the presence of shared intentionality. Nevertheless, 
in the studies cited above, individuals who engaged in synchronous behavior 
reported greater feelings of interpersonal connectedness, rapport, and affilia-
tion, and they sometimes cooperated more in a social dilemma than people in 
asynchronous conditions. Because participants also did not report any shared 
emotions, it is difficult to make sense of such findings on the fellow-feeling 
accounts (or rather, the fellow-feeling approach is at best silent about the 
positive effects of such activities). Instead, the social motivation hypothesis 
seems better equipped in accounting for the pleasure and reward elicited in 
more basic synchronous activities.
Based on this evidence from different synchrony studies, one might con-
clude that the fellow-feeling hypothesis and social motivation hypothesis are 
not in competition but rather explain different kinds of synchrony. However, 
our proposal is that social motivations have a more important role than sim-
ply being one alternative explanation. Instead, we contend that they can 
themselves explain the emergence of fellow-feelings. They do this by provid-
ing a basic platform for how we come to anticipate rewards of social interac-
tions, which in turn informs the design and outcome of future interactions. 
For example, if individuals experience more basic and contingent behavioral 
synchrony as socially rewarding in its own right, we should also expect them 
to establish forms of social interaction in which synchrony and rewards are 
produced intentionally. This seems to be precisely what happens in rituals. 
Although it is very likely that rituals have the capacity to elicit fellow-feel-
ings through the participants’ shared emotions at different stages of the ritual, 
such rewards are nevertheless initially enabled at least in part by social moti-
vations and the anticipation of social rewards.
We thus predict that the opportunity for fellow-feelings, not just in syn-
chronous activities but more generally, is scaffolded by the basic types of 
social-affiliative rewards described by the social motivation hypothesis. One 
way of understanding social motivations as a scaffold is in terms of social 
motivations becoming a condition for more sophisticated interactions like 
rituals. However, the key point, here, is that in doing so, the social motiva-
tions also allow for the emergence of more complex reward structures such as 
the rewards of experiencing shared emotions. In fact, this also seems to be 
true of the resentment hypothesis, that is, the desire to meet, and the aversion 
to frustrate, others’ expectations (Sugden). To the extent that these motiva-
tions account for prosocial behavior, it is because they are enabled by and 
elaborated on the more rudimentary social motivations. In fact, we might 
even have a reason to reconsider moral virtues (Gintis) and the perceived 
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reasonableness of others’ expectations (Bicchieri), as legitimate proximate 
accounts for (some) prosocial behavior if they analogously seem to depend 
on the experience and anticipation of social rewards. In short, if our affilia-
tions with other individuals matter, so will their expectations, interests, and 
moral claims on us. Hence, social motivations explain why moral virtues and 
others’ expectations matter to us or why they, as philosophers like to put it, 
acquire “motivational force.” In fact, it is the strength of the social motivation 
hypothesis that it can function as a plausible scaffold for a range of different 
more sophisticated proximate accounts—without any of them necessarily 
being reduced to the anticipation of an affective reward.
Indeed, given that it is supposed that many social situations in contempo-
rary societies already are governed by some identifiable moral, social, and 
prudential norms governing behavior (or at least identifiable behavioral inter-
active patterns), it would be surprising if social motivations were not involved 
in scaffolding the development of more sophisticated preferences such as 
those described by the existing approaches. In this sense, social motivations 
are always there, so to speak, often by making a prosocial outcome of social 
interaction—be it actual, anticipated, remembered, virtual—at least, prima 
facie inherently rewarding for us. That is not to say that social motivation 
could not explain prosocial behavior on its own without some auxiliary moti-
vational account. On the contrary, we have argued with empirical evidence 
that, in many cases, the motivation to seek social-affiliative rewards is capa-
ble of motivating prosocial behavior, for example, in situations where the 
conditions of other theories of proximate motivation are not met. Thus, the 
social motivation account stands on its own in addition to providing a scaf-
fold for other proximate explanations of prosocial behavior.
6. Conclusion
We began by noting that many existing economic models of prosocial behav-
ior have been rather silent on the proximate psychological mechanisms 
responsible for the target behavior. We identified the most psychologically 
plausible accounts, and then based on this discussion and convergent recent 
evidence from several strands of psychological and biological research, we 
argued for an alternative social motivation hypothesis. Finally, we suggested 
that the social motivation account provides a plausible scaffold for other 
more sophisticated proximate motivations that purport to explain prosocial 
behavior in more complex social interactions.
Let us conclude by briefly addressing some possible implications for eco-
nomic modeling of prosocial behavior. As we stated at the outset, the empiri-
cal and theoretical input from different fields in psychology does not 
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unequivocally adjudicate between competing economic models of prosocial 
behavior. Nor have we proposed yet another utility function based on the 
social motivation hypothesis. Instead, we provided a basic and general proxi-
mate account, namely, social motivations that anticipate rewards attached to 
affiliation and which can scaffold a host of distinct prosocial motivations 
such as moral virtues, aversion to resentment, pleasure of mutual emotions, 
and so on.
Although we do not deny that it is possible to compare different models 
with different motivations in clear-cut experiments (this is one of the points 
of behavioral experiments, after all), an upshot of our argument is that there 
probably will not be a general, single utility function that encompasses all 
prosocial behavior. Instead, our account suggests a form of pluralism that 
requires different prosocial preferences to be elicited by contextual features 
such as the nature of the game or interaction, the past history of interaction, 
the strength of affiliation, and the existing norms or identified teams in a 
community.
Still, the social motivation hypothesis also suggests some ways to orga-
nize this pluralism about preferences. First, given the importance of individ-
ual learning history and environment more generally for the precise 
development of social motivations (as described in both sections 4 and 5), we 
should expect some considerable heterogeneity among people in terms of 
their expectations and preferences in experimental and naturally occurring 
games. A satisfactory theory of prosocial behavior might try to first identify 
the different types of agents in their experiments, and then explain how these 
different types impact on the interaction such as sustaining or declining levels 
of cooperation (cf. Gächter 2007). Second, given that social motivations can 
scaffold a range of distinct prosocial motivations, we should expect that each 
agent often has conflicting preferences that are elicited by variable salient 
contextual cues. Thus, a general theory should ideally attempt to identify 
some general epistemic conditions for the elicitation of different preferences. 
For example Bicchieri’s conditions for payoff transformation and Bacharach’s 
conditions for agency transformation do not necessarily have to be seen as 
rival hypotheses, but instead they can both be part of a more general hypoth-
esis that predicts that different conditions can elicit different preferences in 
the same individual. We hope that our proposal has provided some justifica-
tion for these lines of enquiry.
While what we have said so far is all broadly consistent with the rational 
choice tradition in psychology and economics (although perhaps suspending 
some of its ambitions of complete unification), the social motivation hypoth-
esis might also provide a more basic challenge to the framework, which is the 
following: if affiliative rewards are truly rewards on par with the various 
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material rewards, it may be unhelpful to define or operationalize rewards 
solely in terms of monetary payoffs in games, as, for example, social prefer-
ence models do. After all the research we have discussed suggests that the 
neurobiological basis for such rewards is both partly distinctive from other 
reward circuits, including material ones, and arises early in development and 
is retained throughout life. The hypothesis also makes good evolutionary 
sense given the importance of social bonding for not only well-being but, 
indeed, survival. It is unclear if these ends can consistently be operationalized 
using monetary rewards.
Thus, the social motivation hypothesis really has two primary implica-
tions for economic modeling of sociality roles. One is to posit social motiva-
tions as a scaffolder that generates motivations for norm-following and 
team-reasoning, thus offering a candidate proximate or at least developmen-
tal explanation of prosocial behavior in the standard sense of representing a 
choice to forgo immediate material interests. The second and more provoca-
tive suggestion is that in many social contexts, including perhaps some 
experimental ones, the agent is also concerned with anticipated social-affili-
ative rewards quite independently of the material payoff distribution. In 
future modeling, it might therefore be worthwhile to try to conceptualize and 
operationalize social rewards instead of just monetary rewards, for example, 
by using the kind of basic affiliative stimuli used in the psychological research 
we have drawn on.
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